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THE «CLEAR OBSCURITY» STRIKES BACK: THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 102
AND 106(1) TFEU ACCORDING TO THE OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL WAHL
IN THE GULLOTTA CASE
Introduction
The opinion issued by Advocate General Wahl (hereinafter, the “AG”) in the Gullotta case (C-497/12,
not yet available in English) deserves attention for several reasons. Many of them refer to the sort of
«disappointed guidance» that the AG provides to national courts (and particularly to the Tribunale
Amministrativo Regionale per la Sicilia – hereinafter, the “TAR”) with regard to the correct formulation
of references for preliminary rulings ex art. 267 TFEU.
This entry aims at analysing a specific aspect touched upon in the opinion, i.e. the issue of the correct
interpretation  of  Article  106(1)  TFEU when  applied  in  combination  with  Article  102  TFEU.  The
occasion is provided by the third question referred by the TAR to the European Court of Justice
(hereinafter, the “ECJ”), according to which the latter must establish whether such provisions could
preclude a national legal regime reserving, inter alia, the right to sell Class-C medicines to pharmacies
(thus banning para-pharmacies from this market).
The twofold nature of Article 106(1) TFEU: between national sovereignty and competition  
Notwithstanding its position among the competition rules applicable to undertakings, Article 106(1)
TFEU is addressed primarily to Member States. Indeed, such provision prohibits – both the adoption
and the maintenance in force of – any national measure contrary to any rule contained in the Treaties,
when it comes to undertakings that are either controlled by a public authority, or bear special and
exclusive  rights  (hereinafter,  the  “privileged undertakings”).  In  other  words,  Article  106(1)  TFEU
acknowledges that the Treaties do not preclude Member States from setting up companies and from
conferring them privileges, but then clarifies that these instances shall not conflict with the Treaties
themselves.
Accordingly, Article 106(1) TFEU can be defined as a so-called reference provision: it is not self-
contained, and cannot be applied alone. In order to breach Article 106(1) TFEU, the national measure
at stake should infringe another provision of the Treaties. One may then argue that Article 106(1)
TFEU simply echoes the duty of loyal cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU, and merely reminds
Member States that they shall comply with the Treaties. However, one should further consider that not
every Treaties’ provision is actually addressed to Member States. For example, competition rules refer
only to anticompetitive behaviours performed by one or more undertakings, and usually not to Member
States’  acts.  When applied in  combination with  Articles 101 or  102 TFEU, Article  106(1)  TFEU
therefore extends to Member States the binding force of antitrust provisions. In other words, it prohibits
– the adoption and the maintenance in force of – national measures contrary to rules that are per se
addressed only to economic operators and would not otherwise cover national legislative or regulatory
acts.
Such dichotomy between public and private has further consequences within the context of Article
106(1) TFEU. Indeed, such provision is strictly connected with the (very broad) issue of the definition
of the appropriate place for State intervention in the economy. A question that in the EU legal order is
tackled also by Article 345 TFEU, a rule that offers to Member States another viable legal basis to
create public enterprises. More precisely, Article 106(1) TFEU tries to strike a balance between two
opposite  goals:  on  the  one  hand,  the  EU’s  interest  to  obtain  national  markets  integration  and
liberalisation; on the other hand, the Member States’ interest to retain a certain degree of national
sovereignty in the economic field.
The ECJ’s approach to Articles 106(1) and 102 TFEU: from Sacchi…
Quite  unsurprisingly,  the  twofold  nature  of  Article  106(1)  TFEU influences (and complicates)  its
interpretation and practical application, especially when it comes to its relation with Article 102 TFEU.
The jurisprudence has tackled this issue in several occasions, underlining the contradictory nature (the
«clear obscurity»,  according to AG Tesauro;  see immediately infra)  of  such provision.  The main
reason is «the objective difficulty of reconciling the actual idea of a monopoly or undertaking holding
exclusive rights with a system of free competition and a common market» (AG Tesauro, Terminal
equipment for telecommunications, C-202/88 § 11). To be sure, a market based on competition is at
odds with not only monopolies and privileges, but also with a high level of state involvement in the
industry.  Indeed,  the role  played by the state in  the economy poses an even greater  threat  to
competition than the one played by economic operators, mainly because the former usually pursues
general objectives and policies that may be incompatible with the free market rationale.
The ECJ’s approach has dramatically changed over time, passing from one side to the other (i.e., from
ensuring  Member  States’  economic  sovereignty  to  fostering  competition  and  liberalisation).  The
starting point is represented by the Sacchi judgment, where privileges and public monopolies have not
been considered per se incompatible with Articles 102 and 106(1) TFEU (155/73 § 14). Although the
«Sacchi formula» has ever since been repeated (the AG Wahl’s opinion makes no exception: § 84),
such statement has become a sort of clause de style. Indeed, the more recent jurisprudence has
completely  reversed  the  presumption  of  the  legitimacy  of  public  monopolies  and  privileged
undertakings. In the light of the above, it is not surprising that the shift begun to occur in the aftermath
of the Single European Act, when the EU Commission was beginning to elaborate its wide programme
of Member States’ economies liberalisation.
As a first step, the ECJ has begun to consider incompatible with Article 102 and 106(1) TFEU those
national  measures that  compel  privileged undertakings to  abuse their  dominant  position (i.e.,  to
behave in a way that would be illegitimate under Article 102 TFEU if done voluntarily by an «ordinary»
undertaking). For example, this happens if a national measure forces the privileged undertaking to
impose unfair prices or other trading conditions (Corsica ferries, C-18/93). At a later stage, Articles 102
and 106(1) TFEU begun to be applied also to national measures that – do not compel but – merely
induce public or privileged undertakings to abuse their dominant position, simply by exercising their
special rights. For example, this happens when (i) privileged undertakings are not able to satisfy the
existing demand in their «protected market» (Höfner, C-41/90), or when (ii) Member States couple the
granting of a privilege with the conferral of regulatory powers, creating a conflict of interest for the
privileged undertaking (GB-Inno, C-18/88).
… to DEI (and from the so-called «behaviour theory» to the «effects theory»)
The ECJ’s case law has gone even further within the shaping of a market-based approach to Article
102 and 106(1) TFEU. The bottom line is that such dispositions may apply even in the absence of any
abuse of  the  privileged undertakings.  Accordingly,  it  has  been held  that  national  measures  are
prohibited even if they simply give rise to a risk of a potential abuse of a dominant position (MOTOE,
C-49/07 § 50). The preference for laissez-faire and free market over Member States’ intervention in
the economic is even clearer in the recent Greek lignite case (DEI, C-553/12), where the ECJ has
further lowered the threshold of competitive distortion required to apply Articles 102 and 106(1) TFEU.
In such case, the ECJ confirms that, to assess whether an infringement of such disposition has
occurred, it is irrelevant to consider if the privileged undertaking has actually committed, or may be
induced to commit, any conduct prohibited under Article 102 TFEU (DEI § 41). However, the ECJ
further clarifies that it is irrelevant as well to identify the (purely) hypothetical abuse that the national
measure  may  have  induced  the  undertaking  to  commit.  Rather,  it  suffices  that  a  potential
anticompetitive consequence  is liable to result from the national measure at stake (DEI § 46). A
condition that is affirmed (for the first time not as a mere obiter dictum, but as the only ratio decidendi
of the case) to be fulfilled when a national measure is liable to affect the structure of the market,
merely by creating an inequality of opportunities between economic operators in a given market (DEI §
46). In other words, an abusive behaviour (neither actual or potential – DEI § 47) of the privileged
undertaking is no longer required to trigger the application of Articles 102 and 106(1) TFEU; all that is
necessary is that the national measure has an anticompetitive effect on the market.
Arguably,  such  endorsement  of  the  ECJ  for  the  so-called  «effects  theory»  over  the  opposite
«behaviour theory» (AG Wathelet opinion in DEI § 42) seems to reduce in an inappropriate manner
the place for Member States’ intervention in the economy. Indeed, given that the conferral of special or
exclusive rights (not to mention the creation of  public monopolies) seems to inherently alter  the
opportunities between operators in favour of the privileged undertakings, one may even argue that the
DEI judgment may have the effect of implicitly repeal Article 106(1) TFEU. If the above assumptions
were correct, this would mean that Member States are nowadays free to «get away» from competition
rules only within the limited exceptions provided by Article 106(2) TFEU with regard to the services of
general economic interest. In turn, if national laws and regulations cannot restrict competition (rectius,
cannot  affect  the  structure  of  the  market,  by  creating  an  inequality  of  opportunities  between
undertakings), Member States would have basically lost their sovereign powers within the economic
sphere, for the benefit of the EU Commission.
The AG Wahl opinion in the Gullotta case  
As mentioned above, the Gullotta case deals with the Italian legal regime reserving, inter alia, the right
to sell Class-C medicines to pharmacies, and therefore banning para-pharmacies from this economic
activity. In order to evaluate the compatibility of such regime with Articles 102 and 106(1) TFEU, the
AG affirms  that,  according  to  the  case  law,  an  infringement  of  such  provisions  occurs  in  two
circumstances. On the one hand, this happens when national measures create a situation where
privileged undertakings, merely by exercising their special rights, are led to abuse their dominant
position; on the other hand, when those special rights are liable to create a situation where that
undertakings are led to commit  such abuses (§ 81).  In the AG’s mind,  the question referred is
therefore either inadmissible (§ 82) and without merit  (§ 86) precisely because the TAR has not
indicated how the legal regime under scrutiny could led the pharmacies to abuse their dominant
position pursuant to the exercise of their special rights.
Interestingly enough, the AG suggests that such approach has been followed by the ECJ also in the
DEI judgment (§ 81). Quite to the opposite, as we have explained above, the interpretation proposed
by the AG represents the traditional approach to Articles 102 and 106 TFEU. An approach that, after
having  represented the  standard  of  application  of  such provisions  for  many years,  it  has  been
abandoned by the ECJ precisely in the DEI case.
Conclusive remarks: a step back in the course of the process of sovereignty’s transfer from
Member States to the EU Commission?
If one applies the «DEI formula» to the facts of the Gullotta case, a breach of Articles 102 and 106(1)
TFEU is quite straightforward. Indeed, it is hard to hold that the legal regime at stake does not alter the
equality of opportunities between pharmacies and para-pharmacies. The second category of economic
operators is simply banned from the market. Moreover, according to DEI, there is no need to prove
any further conduct of the privileged undertakings, or any actual or potential abuse of their dominant
position pursuant to their special rights.
One can therefore wonder why the AG has expressly mentioned the DEI judgment while following the
traditional and more restrictive approach to Article 102 and 106(1) TFEU. This question seems to be
explainable in two opposite ways. On the one hand, one may believe that such «incongruity» is
unintentional: becoming one of the victims of the «clear obscurity» of Article 106 TFEU, the AG may
have misunderstood the meaning of the DEI judgment. However, it seems quite unlikely that the AG
has actually committed such an error.
On the other hand, one can then assume that the AG was well aware of the far-reaching implications
of the DEI judgement, but has nevertheless decided to follow this pattern. If this is the case, the
«inaccuracy» can be seen in a whole new light: indeed, quoting a «revolutionary» case as if it has
confirmed the traditional approach is arguably one of the best ways to try to step back from the initial
revirement.This  is  even truer  if  one  does  so  in  the  very  first  occasion  in  which  the  innovative
judgement can be interpreted, as it happened in Gullotta.
If the above supposition were correct (and thus the opinion actually represents a prompt attempt to
reduce the scope of the DEI judgment), one should further infer that the AG considers the «DEI
formula» too broad, and has therefore tried to restore an appropriate place for the intervention of





Tag:  art.  102  TFEU,  art.  106  TFEU,  DEI,  effects  theory,  exclusive  or  special  rights,  privileged
undertakings
Editore: Bruno Nascimbene, Milano
Rivista registrata presso il Tribunale di Milano, n. 278 del 9 settembre 2014
Eurojus © è un marchio registrato
